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THE "QUASI-PUBLIC" FORUM

The economic impact of Fuentes has yet to be demonstrated. The

dissent expressed concern that "the availability of credit may well be

diminished or, in any event, the expense of securing it increased."9 It
seems probable, though, that the requirements of Fuentes will have
minimal effect on consumer credit. Only where the debtor is willing to

destroy or conceal the goods would the creditor's risk be appreciably

increased by the requirement of notice before seizure. And if this is
indeed an "extraordinary circumstance," then Fuentes does not preclude seizure without notice. Moreover, even where required, the ex-

pense of procedural due process need not be substantial, since informal
hearings may suffice in many cases9" and may probably be waived93 in
others. It seems probable that the prophecy of the dissent in Fuentes will

not materialize.
KENT WASHBURN

Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Shopping Centers and the
"Quasi-Public" Forum
That "freedom of speech" involves something more than a federal
and state' laissez-faire attitude toward expression is hardly a novel con-

cept.2 The Supreme Court has typically asserted that an affirmative
"maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion

. . .

is a

Text, but makes the notice provisions more specific. CAL. COMM. CODE ANN. § 9503-04 (1964).
9192 S. Ct. at 2005. This same fear was expressed by the court in Adams. 338 F. Supp. at
622. The same argument was made in support of the California summary attachment procedure
to the court in Randone-and was rejected. Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 555-56,
488 P.2d 13, 24-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721-22 (1971); see Comment, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV., supra
note 72, at 846. Collection agencies also had argued that wage garnishment was essential to the
economy, but an empirical study has indicated that "the extension of consumer credit is unrelated
to garnishment laws." Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California:A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1240 (1965).
"2 See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.

'The first amendment reaches the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2
See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941). Professor Barron
maintains that "[a]s a Constitutional theory for the communication of ideas, laissez-faire is manifestly irrelevant." Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1656 (1967).
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fundamental principle of our constitutional system." ' 3 Yet behind the
rhetoric lies the persistent problem of defining the contours of first
amendment protection in particular situations.4 Especially difficult is
the resolution of those cases which reveal an asserted first amendment
right posed in direct confrontation with other rights and interests no less
traditional in our society.' It is thus interesting to note that in a recent
case involving conflicting claims of free speech and private property
interests, a majority of the Supreme Court found few obstacles in holding squarely on the side of the property owner.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner' involved the mall of a large privately owned
shopping center as the stage for respondents' short-lived attempts to
circulate antiwar leaflets. The shopping center prohibited handbilling on
the premises, and respondents were advised by security guards that a
failure to cease their activity could result in trespass prosecutions. Respondents subsequently petitioned for relief in federal district court, alleging a violation of their first amendment right to distribute leaflets in
Lloyd Center in a nondisruptive manner. In granting broad injunctive
relief,7 the district court cited Marsh v. Alabama' and Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.' as authority for the proposition
that to the extent that private property is open to the public and resembles a "business district," the owner loses the absolute right to prohibit
first amendment activity on his premises.' 0
On appeal," the Supreme Court reversed.' 2 Writing for a five-tofour majority, Justice Powell reasoned that Marsh and Logan Valley
were inapposite precedents for a case in which the asserted first amendment exercise was not related to the shopping center's normal use and
an adequate alternative forum was available. The consistent enforcement of a nondiscriminatory policy prohibiting all handbilling was enti3Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
4
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT vii-viii (1963).
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armbands
threatens school discipline); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (destruction of draft

card).
692 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
'Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
8326 U.S. 501 (1946).
9391 U.S. 308 (1968).
"*308 F. Supp. at 132.

"The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision per curiam.
Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
t"Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
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tled to protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-

ment. 13 Justice Marshall in dissent sharply attacked the majority's
opinion as an arbitrary limitation of the rationale of Logan Valley and

Marsh. 4 An understanding of the judicial conflicts present in this case
is impossible at this point without a brief review of Marsh and Logan
Valley and their place in first amendment theory.

One first amendment concept that runs consistently throughout
cases and commentaries alike is that an open "marketplace of ideas" is

essential to the health of a democratic society.' 5 To maintain an informed electorate as a check on the powers of the state, it is held

necessary that debate, "even of ideas we hate,"' 6 be kept "uninhibited,

robust, and wide open."' 17 The rights protected by the first amendment

are the rights of the public, and the special solicitude shown by the
courts for the guarantees of free "speech"' 8 attests to judicial recognition of this public interest. 9 This concept has received dramatic support

in the Supreme Court's development of special protection of the "public
forum." The town square, the streets, the parks, and the sidewalks of a

community have been accorded special status as the proper and traditional locale for public discussion and assembly. Although the privilege

of their use may be regulated in the public interest, "it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.""0 Of central importance is

'31d. at 2228.
"Id. at 2230 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
365 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally T. EMERSON, supra

note 4; A.

MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM

(1948).

""Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices
and preconceptions." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
""Speech" in the first amendment sense includes more than verbal expression. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armband); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ("freedom march"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)
(picketing). But even "pure speech" is not absolutely protected, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919), and first amendment exercise may be regulated to the extent that it conflicts with
other important interests, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Professor Kalven
suggests that the pure speech-speech plus dichotomy is misleading. He proposes instead the notion
that regulation of speech should be deemed constitutionally permissible only insofar as it controls
conduct and not content. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REv. 1, 25-27. See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, at 24-28.
"Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969): "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here."
2Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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the assumption that the public's access to all sides of an issue can best
be protected by providing a readily available forum for the "poor man's
press": the leaflets, placards, and soapbox oratory of those who have
exclusive media, but whose ideas deno access to more expensive or
21
serve to be heard nevertheless.
Marsh v. Alabama2 2 represented another step in the genesis of the
public forum doctrine, but with a new twist. When Gracie Marsh sought
to distribute religious literature in the downtown business district of
Chickasaw, Alabama, she was treading on private, not public property.
Her chosen forum for spreading the Word chanced to be in the midst
of a company town owned lock, stock, and sidewalk by a private corporation. Simply posed, the issue was whether a "private" town could
impose restrictions that would not pass constitutional scrutiny if they
emanated from a municipality. The Court held that it could not. In
reversing the trespass conviction, Justice Black stressed the interests of
the community's citizens in free access to uncensored information. 3
The fact that title to the property was privately held was of little consequence; a corporation, carrying on what properly were state functions
of municipal government, could not restrict the residents' rights any
more than could the state. Property rights were not to be taken as
absolute: "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the
24
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."
25
Marsh was more than just an interesting "state action" case. Of
no small import to Justice Black were the interests of the public, not
merely the rights of the individual defendant, in the maintenance of an
open channel of communication. Logan Valley found this theme no less
relevant to the modern shopping center. The case involved a labor
union's peaceful picketing of a supermarket located in a private shop21

Cf Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1942), wherein Justice Black spoke of
the "poorly financed causes of little people."
-326 U.S. 501 (1946).

uChickasaw residents "must make decisions which affect the welfare of the community and
nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed . . . It]heir information must be uncensored." 326 U.S. at 508.
2'326 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added).
"In Marsh, "state action" for fourteenth amendment purposes was found in the delegation
of normal state functions to a private concern. See the further discussion of "state action" problems
infra.
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ping center. A five-to-four majority held that state trespass law could
not be the basis of an antipicket injunction. Characterizing Marsh as
representative of the principle that "under some circumstances property
that is privately owned may, at least for First Amendment purposes, be
treated as though it were publicly held, '2 6 Justice Marshall found no
significant distinction between Chickasaw's business district and Logan
Valley Plaza. In support of the holding that the center was "clearly the
functional equivalent of the business district . . involved in Marsh,"
he noted the substantial size of the shopping center involved, the public's
unrestricted access to Plaza property, the presence of two large enterprises, and the elaborate system of streets and sidewalks traversing the
27
complex.
It is true that Justice Black, the father of Marsh, refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Marsh's offspring in Logan Valley. It is
further true that Justice Marshall's shopping center-business district
comparison glossed over some factual dissimilarities between the two
cases that the dissenting opinions found important. 28 One must examine
the reason why Justice Marshall found the analogy so compelling. A
clue may be found in the closing passages of his opinion in which he
examined the sociological impact of the "advent of the suburban shopping center. ' 29 Here he made it clear that the shopping center had
become such an important phenomenon in suburban life that any decision restricting the exercise of first amendment freedoms in such areas
would adversely affect "workers seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, consumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise,
and minority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring practices." 3
Such a result would be "at variance with the goal of free expression and
communication that is at the heart of the First Amendment. '31 Measured in this context, the owner's property rights were not so strong as
to negate the public interests involved.
2'Id. at 316.
1Jd. at 317-18.
"Justice Black insisted in Logan Valley that Marsh allowed private property to be treated as
public only when it had taken on all the attributes of a municipality and not merely a few. Id. at
327 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice White added the fear that the rationale of Logan Valley would
compel all businesses to open up to unwanted first amendment activity. Id. at 338-40 (White, J.,

ddissenting).
"391 U.S. at 324.
3Id.
111d. at 325.
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Two points central to the reasoning in Logan Valley merit special
attention. First, the view of the shopping center as an increasingly significant forum for suburban activity led to the "business district" analogy.
Justice Marshall reasserted this point in Lloyd: "For many . . .citi-

zens, Lloyd Center will so completely satisfy their wants that they will
have no reason to go elsewhere. .

.

. If speech is to reach these people,

it must reach them in Lloyd Center. ' 32 The suburban shopping center
does not merely resemble the urban business district; it replaces it.
Secondly, although the public's interest in the maintenance of an open
forum was found to outweigh the owner's property interests in Logan
Valley, the owner was said to retain the power to make "reasonable
regulations" as to the location and manner of the first amendment
exercise on his property3 The Court's holding was- the result of a
balancing process that weighed the various interests of each party.
In spite of the inventiveness of Logan Valley's extension of the
Marsh "principle," the opinion unfortunately contained one major
ambiguity. The holding was limited to a situation in which the "message
sought to be conveyed" concerned the employment practices of a store
on the premises; expressly not considered was "whether . . .property
rights could . . .justify a bar on [first amendment activity] n6t thus

directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center
was being put. ' 34 The intended meaning of this language is not clear.35
Typical of the confusion that resulted was the disparate treatment given
on two levels of appeal to a post-Logan Valley case involving
"unrelated-to" first amendment activity. In Diamond v. Bland,'3 plaintiffs sought to confirm their alleged right to enter a private shopping
center and solicit signatures for an anti-pollution petition. The California Court of Appeals refused relief. Relying on Logan Valley's "relatedto" language, the court fashioned a twofold requirement: the asserted
first amendment exercise must be both relevant to shopping center busi3Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 2234 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
3391 U.S. at 320-21. Thus the owner may reasonably regulate conduct but not content. Cf.
note 18 supra.
11391 U.S. at 320 n.9.
"It has been suggested that the limitation was an attempt to calm the fears of dissenting
Justice White. Comment, The Shopping Center: Quasi-Public Forum for Suburbia, 6 U.S.F.L.
REV. 103, 108 (1971).
3'8 Cal. App. 3d 58, 87 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1970), rev'd, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr.
501, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
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ness and without any effective alternative channel of communication
before it may demand a forum on private property.37 On appeal the
California Supreme Court reversed. Conceding that the question of
"relatedness" merited some consideration, the majority nevertheless
concluded that plaintiffs' interests outweighed the owner's right to impose a complete ban on nonrelated communicatory activity. Regardless
of the possibility of alternative forums available to the plaintiffs, the
court stressed that access to the center provided a particularly appropriate vehicle for the obtaining of signatures on a petition. 8 A completely
different "balance" was struck than that obtained in the lower court.
The two Diamond cases prove that Logan Valley's "related-to"
language could be conveniently seized upon or as easily bypassed, depending upon the result desired. The Lloyd decision has now at least
identified the authoritative (five-to-four) interpretation. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, emphasized the lack of any relation, direct or
indirect, between antiwar leafletting and shopping center operations. He
further noted that respondents had been free to pursue their handbilling
in the public areas outside Lloyd Center.3 9 These two factors were
deemed sufficient to distinguish the Lloyd situation from that in Logan
Valley:
Logan Valley extended Marsh . . . only in a context where the
First Amendment activity was related to the shopping center's operations. . . . The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the
suggestion that the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a business
district or a shopping center are the equivalent,for First Amendment
purposes, of municipally owned streets and sidewalks."
Thus, a footnote in Logan Valley indicating what was not being
decided" was elevated to the status of expressing the "rationale" of that
case. The Lloyd court adopted substantially the same formula as that
engendered in the California intermediate court's treatment of
Diamond. Once this judicial plastic surgery was performed, the respondents' theories were quickly dismissed. Their argument that Lloyd Center was open to the public and resembled in function the public forum
1'8 Cal. App. 3d at 73-74, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
13 Cal. 3d at 662, 477 P.2d at 738, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 506; accord, Sutherland v. Southcenter
Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1971).
"Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 2226-27 (1972).
4
°ld. at 225-26 (emphasis added).
"1See text accompanying note 34 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 51

of a municipal business district could now be rejected as "considerably
broader than the rationale in Logan Valley."4 In short, "[t]he Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of
private property to public use."4
Dissenting in Lloyd, Justice Marshall observed that the majority
was "obviously troubled" by the decision in Logan Valley. Certainly it
is significant that Justice Powell's analysis of Logan Valley quoted
extensively and with approval from the dissenting opinions in that case.' 4
The Lloyd majority apparently felt that Logan Valley represented the
maximum in imposing constitutionally tolerable burdens on the property owner's interests. First amendment interests were deemed sufficiently protected by requiring a forum to be provided on private property only where both (a) the speech is "directly related" to the normal
use of the locale, and (b) no "adequate" alternative forum exists."
Forcing an owner to yield in other situations "would diminish property
rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free
speech."' 6
The "related to" and "no adequate alternative" criteria may be
seen as an attempt to formulate workable guidelines for the complex
process of accomodating conflicting rights. If this is so, the question is
whether it is a successful attempt. An examination of a number of
problems implicit in the Lloyd holding is therefore appropriate.
A.

THE UNEASY

MARRIAGE OF "RELATED

To"

AND "ADEQUATE

ALTERNATIVE FORUM"

Justice Marshall indicated in his Lloyd dissent that the shopping
center management in the past had found it a good business practice to
allow the use of its facilities by certain political candidates and service
organizations. Thus, he reasoned, having already opened its premises to
492 S. Ct. at 2226.
43

1d. at 2229.
"Id.at 2226-27.
45
Logan Valley was characterized as representing just such a situation and no more:
The [Logan Valley] opinion was carefully phrased to limit its holding to the picketing involved, where the picketing was "directly related in its purpose to the use to which
the shopping center property was being put" . . . and where . . . no other reasonable
opportunities for the pickets to convey their message . . . were available.
Neither of these elements is present in the case now before the Court.
Id. at 2226.
"Id. at 2228.
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first amendment activities, Lloyd Center should not be heard to claim
that respondents' handbilling was not related to the normal use of the
mall.47 This interpretation was rejected. Instead, Justice Powell apparently would require that the subject of the message touch more directly

on some aspect of the center's retail enterprise. But how substantial
should the connection be? What of the situation in which the ultimate

objective of a protest relates only indirectly to a part of the shopping
center, as where a union pickets a store because that store buys advertis-

ing space from an antiunion newspaper?" To go one step further, could
the respondents in Lloyd have transformed their handbilling into "related" activity simply by amending their leaflets to include a protest

against the sale of Dow Chemical products by a shopping center store?
It is doubtful that such a transparent maneuver would succeed," but the

contours of the "related to" requirement remain unclear nevertheless.
When considered in light of the amount of traffic involved and the

convenience of the public, a shopping center may be the most effective
and appropriate place to gather signatures for a petition. On the other

hand, any public sidewalk might be deemed an "adequate alternative"
to the shopping center forum when no more than the assurance of some
opportunity for the message to get to some of the public is examined.

It is not clear to what degree the Lloyd concept of "adequate" encompasses the idea of "equally effective." At the very least, an adequate

alternative forum should be one that reaches substantially the same
audience, whether or not the message had been directed specifically to

them or generally to the public. Any lesser measure would ignore the
"public forum" basis of the first amendment. Thus the Lloyd criteria
are ambiguous. Justice Powell noted at one point in his opinion that
respondents could have moved to "any public street" (access to some
"If a "quasi-public" enterprise has offered a neutral forum for some "speech" of a certain
medium, it cannot logically claim that it is hurt by having to accept other "speech" of the same
medium and on the same basis, without regard to content. This "equal protection" approach to
the first amendment has gained some limited acceptance in recent mass media cases. See, e.g.,
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972) (broadcasting station must accept antiwar editorials); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (school newspaper must publish antiwar editorial); Wirta
v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967)
(transit company that accepts commercial ads must accept political ads). See also Barron, AccessThe Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TExAs L. REV. 766 (1970).
4
'Jn re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969). The Lane court held
that the shopping center must provide a forum.
49
Cf Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
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of the public);5 elsewhere, however, he emphasized that access to the
patrons of Lloyd Center (the same audience) was readily available on
the sidewalks surrounding the complex. 5
It is obvious that the more the message is related to the normal use
of the shopping center, the less likely it is that a suitable alternative
forum exists, since the message propagated in any other place would
prove largely irrelevant. "Related to" and "adequate alternative forum"
are thus interrelated criteria. But one is not always the function of the
other. Consider the assertion of "nonrelated to" first amendment activity in the context of a private shopping center located at the crossroads
of a private industrial complex but otherwise proximate to no streets or
sidewalks on which the "speech" could safety be exercised. Areas such
as this are not uncommon today; presumably it was this kind of phenomenon, less the physical copy of the town square than its functional
replacement, upon which Justice Marshall was meditating when he
wrote Logan Valley. As applied here, the dual requirement test of Lloyd
would apparently deny use of the center to those without consent. Yet
with no forum available, "adequate" or otherwise, the public right to
an open "marketplace of ideas" would be abridged." Insofar as it is
intended to preserve a proper balance between first amendment interests
and private property rights, the Lloyd formula breaks down at this
point.
B.

THE UNEASY DIVORCE OF

Lloyd

FROM

Logan Valley

Justice Powell's argument in Lloyd stressed the protection of property accorded by the due process clause and found that free speech
would not be "significantly enhanced" by allowing respondents to prevail. Justice Marshall stressed in dissent the "preferred place" of freedom of speech "in our hierarchy of values" 3 and found that the prop1192 S. Ct. at 2227.
'lid. at 2228.
"rhere is room for the contention that such a result is not necessarily compelled by Lloyd,
since affording a forum in this case would "significantly enhance" the right of free speech. However, with Logan Valley specifically restricted to the fact situation in which both the elements of
"related to" and "no adequate alternative" are present, see note 45 and accompanying text supra,
such an argument would have to be forged anew from a general theory that the first amendment
requires affirmative state action in the providing of public forums. But Lloyd indicates that the
present majority of the Court is something less than receptive to this concept. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
"92 S. Ct. at 2234 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
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erty rights asserted in Lloyd paled in comparison. The two opinions
simply approached the same problem from opposite ends of the spectrum.
But Lloyd represents more than a limitation of the holding in
Logan Valley. If Lloyd did not expressly overrule the holding in Logan
Valley, it effectively mutilated its rationale. This discussion thus far has
been confined to the subject of shopping centers because, after Lloyd,
it is doubtful whether Logan Valley has precedential value in any other
context. The key to this problem lies in the concept of "state action."
Before first amendment rights may be asserted in a nonfederal context,
some involvement of the state in the alleged abridgement of free speech
must be found to invoke the fourteenth amendment. Marsh was based
on the fiction that municipal government carried on by a private concern
constituted a delegation of state authority. However, if the state is
primarily responsible for the maintenance of its municipalities, it is not
so affirmatively charged with regard to shopping centers. Thus, Justice
Marshall's reliance on Marsh to extend first amendment protection
within the confines of Logan Valley Plaza represented a rather dramatic
extension of notions of state action. His treatment of Marsh implied
that as private property takes on the attributes of a citizens' forum, the
first amendment compels the state to guarantee free speech no less than
on the public streets.
By undercutting Justice Marshall's "business district" analogy, the
Lloyd majority effectively sterilizes Logan Valley as authority for this
concept of the "quasi-public forum." The validity of various applications of the Logan Valley rationale54 to non-shopping center situations
is thus put in doubt. More importantly, the Lloyd majority's distinguishing away of Logan Valley connotes a conservative reluctance to
embrace the concept of the "quasi-public" forum. At least where private
property interests are concerned, the Court does not seem very sympathetic to the argument that social regulation should assume a more
affirmative role in the maintenance of the open forum. 5
51E.g., Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968) (bus terminal); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967)
(railway terminal).
"Cf T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 38: "The complexities of modern society have introduced
into the free marketplace of ideas blockages and distortions that can only be removed by affirmative social controls."
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CONCLUSION

Lloyd Corporationv. Tanner is an unfortunate decision. The Lloyd
test of "related to" and "adequate alternative forum" conceals more
problems than it resolves. The Lloyd rationale cripples Logan Valley
without attempting to refute its logic. And the Lloyd result, although
perhaps acceptable on the particular facts of the case,56 represents a
rather inflexible approach to the delicate process of accommodating
conflicting rights. Taken together, Logan Valley and Lloyd pose such a
sharp contrast that one is tempted to sympathize with Justice Marshall:
"I am aware," he said, "that the composition of this Court has radically

changed.

....

57
FRANK M. PARKER, JR.

Constitutional Law-Jury Unanimity No Longer Required in State

Criminal Trials
For more than six centuries the common law tradition has required
a unanimous vote of a twelve-man jury to convict an accused in a
criminal proceeding.' The Burger Court, in a pair of sharply divided
opinions, has radically altered that traditional formula. Two years ago,

in Williams v. Florida,2 the Court held that the twelve-man jury panel
is not an indispensable element of the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee. A panel of six was found adequate in that case, and the Court
left open the possibility of an even smaller jury in some cases. More
recently, in Apodaca v. Oregon3 and a companion case from Louisiana,
'If, as Justice Powell maintained, respondents could have moved to the sidewalks surrounding
Lloyd Center and reached virtually the same audience as was inside the mall, Lloyd's reversal of
the lower court's decision did not compromise first amendment interests. An inquiry into whether
or not an equally effective forum existed would have been relevant to the balancing of rights
involved. However, the "related to" criterion is immaterial to the balancing process. Furthermore,
its use allows the property owner an unjustified measure of control over the content of the asserted
"speech."

5192 S. Ct. at 2237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

11.W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (7th ed. 1956); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 88-90 (1898).
2399 U.S. 78 (1970).
192 S. Ct. 1628 (1972). The companion case, Johnson v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1620 (1972),
was originally tried several months before the Court's decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), which held the sixth amendment jury trial right applicable to the states under the due

